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Chapter 9
Buddhism, Beauty and Virtue
David E. Cooper
 The Buddhist Suspicion of Beauty
Not many books discuss the Buddhist conception of beauty, but in recent years 
some innovative and popular Buddhist teachers have made large claims about the 
importance for Buddhists of appreciating the beauty of things. The Sri Lankan 
teacher of meditation, Godwin Samararatne, even suggests that ‘to awaken our 
mind’ to natural beauty is the very point of ‘getting up in the morning … and medi-
tation’ (Samararatne 2011, 62). Stephen Batchelor proposes that the ‘focused aware-
ness’ Buddhists seek is ‘also an experience of beauty’, in which our aesthetic 
experience of the world is ‘vividly enhanced’ (Batchelor 1998, 105). Sangharakshita 
seems to concur with a view he attributes to some Tibetan texts, that ‘our overall 
attitude to life’ and the universe should be ‘purely aesthetic’ (Sangharakshita 
1996, 188).
Some of these authors, however, have elsewhere had their doubts. Sangharakshita 
worries that there is a ‘tension’, even a ‘conflict’, between his respective urges to be 
‘a seeker of truth’ and a believer in an ‘aesthetic absolute’ (Sangharakshita 1995, 
55). Batchelor, recounting his disillusionment with Tibetan Buddhism, speaks of a 
‘reawakening of … aesthetic sensibility’ through his acquaintance with Zen – the 
only school, he adds, that appreciates the arts as a ‘practice’ rather than as ‘decora-
tive adornments’ (Batchelor 2011, 61, 71).
I think these authors are right to have had their doubts. I, too, once had the ambi-
tion of showing how central to Buddhist teachings is a concern with the beauty of 
things. Further acquaintance with the texts persuaded me, however, that they do not 
communicate a sustained, central and positive concern with worldly beauty. By ‘the 
texts’ here, I mean primarily those of the Pali canon, but matters are hardly different 
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with the Mahayana sutras. When enthusiasm is expressed for worldly beauty, as in 
The Larger SukhƗvatƯ-vyǌha, this is, as the title of the sutra suggests, for ‘another’ 
world from our own – ‘The Land of Bliss’ or ‘The Pure Land’.
The predominant attitude to the beauty of things in the classical texts is one of 
suspicion and sometimes hostility. Physical beauty, especially that of women, is 
accused of causing ‘attachment’ and ‘craving’. ‘The sign of the beautiful’, explains 
one of The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, is ‘the nutriment … for sensual 
desire’ (Bodhi 2000, 1568) and thereby, as a Commentary on the Visuddhimagga 
claims, of ‘greed, hate and delusion’ too (Buddhaghoৢa 1991, 752). Enjoyment of 
one thing’s beauty, and repulsion at another thing’s ugliness, is incompatible, more-
over, with the great virtue of equanimity that enjoins us to be ‘mindful and clearly 
comprehending’ of things as they are, and not as they are filtered through a subjec-
tive prism (Bodhi 2000, 1609). Finally, worldly beauty is suspect since attention to 
it easily distracts from the ubiquity of suffering in the world. A colleague of mine, 
when researching on Thai Buddhism, was shown around a monastery garden by the 
chief monk. ‘Beautiful, isn’t it?’, sighed my friend. ‘No, no!’, replied the monk, 
‘here too all is suffering’. The antidote to being seduced by beauty away from atten-
tion to suffering is the exhortation, in many of the Buddha’s discourses, to focus 
one’s awareness on ‘the foul’ – on, say, rotting corpses. (These and other suspicions 
are clearly articulated by Story 1985, 400–4004.)
The texts are not, of course, uniformly hostile to beauty. A few discourses, as 
well as several of the (Male) Elders’ verses (TherƗgathƗ), testify to an appreciation 
of natural beauty by the Buddha and his monks. In the The Numerical Discourses, 
and elsewhere, the Buddha explains that, not only is beauty a legitimate desire of 
householders, but a reward that a woman who has lived without anger, hatred and 
resentment might expect when she is reborn (Nyanaponika and Bodhi 2000, 122, 
134). Focusing on an object like a beautiful disc (kasiӖa) is also held to be useful in 
tranquillity meditation.
Despite these concessions, enthusiasm for the beauty of things in the Buddhist 
canon is, at the very least, muted. ‘The Buddhist does not avoid objects of beauty’, 
as one modern Sri Lankan scholar puts it, but he ‘refrains from making them the 
basis for … likes and dislikes’ (Dhirasekara 1965, 10). Certainly a Buddhist should 
not regard these objects as the very purpose of ‘getting up in the morning’.
This downbeat verdict raises the question of why the authors cited at the begin-
ning make such hyperbolic claims about a Buddhist enthusiasm for the beauty of 
things. None of them, in fact, provide any textual support for these claims, and on 
the rare occasions when texts are cited in support, an author is typically guilty of 
questionable translation or failure to understand the special context of a remark. 
One translator of the Dhammapada, for example, makes the large claim that, for the 
Buddha, ‘love is beauty … [and] to see the beauty of the universe is to see [its] truth’ 
(Mascaró 1973, 20). He cites two passages in support. The first, from The Collected 
Discourses, he translates as ‘friendship [association and communion] with the 
beautiful … is the whole of the holy life’. But as Bhikkhu Bodhi explains in his 
authoritative translation of the work, not only is it questionable to render the word 
‘kalya’ as ‘beautiful’, but it refers not to the object of friendship or communion, but 
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to the quality of this relationship between human beings, monks in particular. A bet-
ter translation, therefore, would speak of the holiness of good friendship, comrade-
ship and the like (Bodhi 2000, 1524).
Mascaró also cites a passage from The Long Discourses where mention is made 
of ‘attaining to the stage of the release [or ‘deliverance’] called “the beautiful”’ 
(Walshe 1987, 382). But the reference here is to the meditational technique of focus-
ing on a disc that I mentioned earlier. Whatever the efficacy of this technique in 
developing a person’s meditational skills, it provides not the slightest warrant for 
extravagant claims about the Buddha’s identification of beauty with truth. This is 
not to preclude the possibility that there is beauty in experiencing truth, but this 
would be a type of beauty I have not yet introduced, to which I now turn.
 ‘Inner’ Beauty
I have been careful to speak, so far, not of beauty simpliciter, but of the beauty of 
things and of the world. It is to these kinds or domains of beauty to which my down-
beat judgement on the place of beauty in Buddhism applied. I now turn to exploring 
the possibility that there is another mode of beauty which is more central in Buddhist 
teachings.
Early on in a discussion of beauty, Bhikkhu Bodhi announces that he does ‘not 
use the word to refer to physical beauty, to a beautiful face and a lovely figure, but 
to inner beauty, the beauty of the mind’ (Bodhi 2001, 13). The Indian artist, Shakti 
Maira, likewise proposes that what is important in Buddhist aesthetics is ‘the beauty 
of an inner state of mind’ or ‘the beauty of the inner reality’ (Maira 2003, 54). 
Several other contemporary writers also emphasize the importance of ‘inner’ beauty 
in Buddhism.
‘Inner’ is not perhaps the ideal word. It might be better to refer to beauty of char-
acter, beauty of the person, or to moral beauty. For it is not, I think, the intention of 
the two authors I cited to postulate a private, inner realm or entity disjoined from 
bodily and physical existence. Indeed, to do so might be hard to reconcile with the 
Buddhist doctrine of not-self. So familiar has talk of inner beauty become, however, 
that I’ll continue to use the expression myself – but to refer, simply, to the beauty 
that belongs to a person in virtue of their character, moral qualities, understanding 
and experience. The expression, as I use it, implies no commitment to the indepen-
dence of mind from body, or of an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’.
By contrast with the beauty of things or the world, there is good textual evidence 
for the importance of inner beauty in the Buddhist dispensation. In the Cakkavatti- 
SƯhanƗda sutta, the Buddha answers his own question, ‘What is beauty for a monk?’, 
with a list of merits that include right conduct, restraint, perfection in habit, and an 
awareness of ‘danger in the slightest fault’ (Walshe 1987, 405). In the verses of the 
(Female) Elders (TherƯgƗthƗ), who repeatedly celebrate their emancipation from a 
desire to cultivate physical beauty, there is an interesting reference to one nun, 
SubhƗ, who it is said ‘went forth full of faith, beautiful by reason of the true doctrine 
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[saddhamma-sobhaӖƗ]’ (Norman 1995, 363). In the Abhidhamma literature, whole 
sections are devoted to categorizing and defining the various forms of ‘beautiful 
consciousness’ (sobhanƗ citta) and the ‘beautiful mental factors’ (sobhanƗ ceta-
sika) – including compassion, non-delusion and mindfulness – some of which are 
present in all the beautiful states of consciousness (NƗroda 1993).
There is, however, something unsatisfying about the many references, both in the 
ancient texts and in modern writings, to inner beauty. None of the authors attempt 
to provide a warrant for their use of the term ‘beauty’ in talking about the inner – 
about character and virtues, for example. Why does the Buddha not speak of the 
restrained, alert, right thinking monk as simply being ‘good’ or ‘holy’? Why describe 
him, in addition, as beautiful? And why was SubhƗ beautiful, rather than just virtu-
ous, by reason of dhamma? Again, why does Bodhi say that loving kindness (mettƗ) 
brings not simply ‘joy, happiness and peace’, but ‘inner beauty to the mind’? (Bodhi 
2001, 20).
In the absence of answers to these questions, the suspicion lurks that ‘beauty’ is 
being used in a figurative or distended way in the passages I have cited, and that it 
is therefore doing no real work, and adding nothing of substance, in the discussions 
of people’s character and mental dispositions. For what, crucially, is missing is any 
attempt to connect this alleged inner beauty with the beauty of things as seen, heard 
or otherwise perceived through the ordinary senses, such as sight and hearing. It is, 
after all, the domain of the sensory or phenomenal – of what may be perceptually 
experienced – that is surely the primary home of beauty, the one within which appli-
cations of ‘beautiful’ and other aesthetic terms first get their sense and force. As 
children, we learn the use of terms like ‘beautiful’ through witnessing their applica-
tion to what is visible, audible or otherwise available to the senses. Only later, and 
on this basis, are we able to understand the application of the terms to mathematical 
theorems, moral virtues or the attainment of enlightenment.
The eighteenth-century pioneers of modern aesthetics – Hutcheson, Baumgarten, 
Kant and others – displayed their recognition of the primacy of the sensory by defin-
ing ‘beauty’ in terms of sensory experience. But it had already been recognized by 
much earlier thinkers, for many of whom sensory beauty was a sign of some more 
elevated form of beauty. Plato, for example, makes clear in Phaedrus (249–50) that 
the ‘true beauty’ of the ultimately real is something that we earthlings may only 
discern when ‘reminded by the sight of beauty on earth’ – beauty that is ‘appre-
hended’ through sight, ‘the keenest of our physical senses’. The route to the appre-
ciation of ‘true beauty’ prescribed to Socrates by Diotima in The Symposium begins, 
accordingly, with the sight of ‘beautiful bodies’. For medieval Christian theolo-
gians, too, while it may be the beauty of God that finally matters, this is a notion we 
can make sense of only through its relationship to that of sensory beauty. As the 
twelfth-century founder of the Basilica of Saint-Denis, Abbé Suger, put it, ‘the 
multi-coloured loveliness of gems has … transport[ed] me from material to immate-
rial things’, for our ‘dull mind’ is incapable of rising to the truth except ‘through that 
which is material’ (cited in Raguin 2003, 14). It is in this manner, too, that one 
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should interpret Aquinas’s succinct definition of beauty as ‘what pleases through 
being seen’.
To return to the literature on the Buddhist idea of beauty, it is true that some writ-
ers have proposed certain analogies between inner beauty and that of objects of 
perceptual experience, with the intention perhaps of justifying their references to 
inner beauty. Bodhi, for instance, compares a beautiful mind with a beautiful gar-
den: neither is ‘wild’ or ‘disorderly’ (Bodhi 2001, 28). Like beautiful artworks, 
Maira remarks, the beautiful mind possesses ‘balance’, ‘proportion’ and ‘rhythm’ 
(Maira 2003, 54). But unless such analogies are developed and deepened, suspicion 
about the merely figurative use of ‘beauty’ re-arises, this time in the form of a worry 
that terms like ‘disorderly’, ‘rhythm’ and ‘proportion’ are being emptied of their 
aesthetic content when they are applied to the inner realm. The mind of a man gov-
erned by craving and delusion may be disorderly, but is this disorder seriously akin 
to that of an untended garden?
It is true also that some texts – albeit ones hardly typical of the Buddhist empha-
sis on transformation of the mind – postulate causal connections between character 
and physical beauty, with the purpose perhaps of inviting a transfer of the vocabu-
lary of beauty from the latter to the former. One thinks, for example, of the passages 
mentioned earlier where the Buddha describes physical beauty as a future karmic 
reward for a virtuous life. But causal connections like this are insufficient to warrant 
a transfer of terms from physical beauty to its cause in a person’s character. To sup-
pose that they are sufficient is like thinking that exercise and a healthy diet, because 
they help you to look beautiful, must themselves be beautiful.
If references to inner beauty are to be justified, more intimate connections than 
ones of analogy and cause-and-effect need to be established between the inner per-
son and the primary domain of beauty – that of phenomena, of things as experienced 
through the ordinary senses. The following two sections seek to establish such con-
nections and to suggest, in addition, that these were anticipated in early Buddhist 
texts.
 Expression and Virtue
‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (Wittgenstein 1969, 178). 
Just as a painting may express the feelings of an artist, so the body – through ges-
ture, comportment, facial expression, or demeanour – is an expression of a person’s 
‘inner reality’, his or her character. It is, I propose, only when the inner finds beauti-
ful expression in the bodily that there is good reason to speak of inner beauty. When 
it does find such expression, it is not difficult to see why we should want to extend 
references to the beauty of what does the expressing – a gesture, say – to that of 
what is expressed, such as the virtue of compassion. This extension resembles the 
one we naturally make when, for instance, describing a mood as angry because of 
the angry behaviour that we take to be an expression of it. Or when a person’s 
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attitude is described as cheerful because of the cheerful smile and gestures that con-
vey it to other people.
The beautiful soul, one might say, is beautiful because its bodily expression in 
the world is beautiful. Expression, therefore, is just the kind of intimate connection 
required between the inner and the outer if aesthetic terms are to loop back, as it 
were, from the outer to the inner. It will be useful in what follows to have a single 
word for what it is about a person’s character, mind or ‘inner reality’ that qualifies it 
for being described as beautiful. I propose the word ‘virtue’. This is not to be taken 
in a narrow sense, as applying only to moral virtues like fairness and honesty, but in 
a sense that encompasses admirable aspects of a person – such as mindfulness and 
equanimity – that might not, in modern society, be counted among the specifically 
moral virtues.
The claim made in this section, then, is that the virtuous mind or character is only 
beautiful because it finds beautiful expression in and through the body. The idea that 
virtue, like courage, finds bodily expression is no more difficult and controversial 
than the idea of bodily expression of feelings, like anger and sadness. A gesture, for 
example, is an expression of anger or courage when it is itself angry or courageous, 
and in a way that presents itself as having such a quality, at least to the mindful 
observer. There is, however, a challenge to the claim that does require addressing. 
Why, it will be asked, should virtue – at all generally, at least – find expression in 
beautiful gestures, comportment and the like? Isn’t it a matter of luck – a merely 
contingent matter – whether or not compassion, say, or humility is beautifully 
expressed? And if it is, then expression cannot be the intimate connection between 
the inner and the outer that we were seeking.
My response to the challenge is that the connection is not at all a contingent one 
or a matter of luck. I want to say that beauty – an important form of it, at least – that 
is expressed bodily just is the expression of virtue. More exactly: we recognize and 
appreciate gestures, facial expressions and so on as beautiful precisely because we 
experience them as expressions of virtue. The woman’s smile, for example, is found 
to be beautiful because it is seen to expresses compassion. The monk’s comport-
ment is judged to be beautiful because it is experienced as an expression of humility. 
It may, of course, be that in a particular case the expression of compassion or humil-
ity is faked. But that doesn’t alter the fact that our ground for finding the smile or 
comportment beautiful is the perception of it as an expression of virtue. Behaviour 
that expresses anger may be feigned: that does not mean that the connection between 
angry behaviour and an angry mood is merely contingent. Nor is the connection 
between beauty of expression and virtue.
This ‘virtue-centric’ view of bodily beauty, as it might be labelled (see Cooper 
2009), was articulated by Immanuel Kant in a section, rather neglected until recently, 
of his Critique of Judgement called ‘The ideal of beauty’ (Kant 2008, §17). Beauty, 
he argues, belongs in the first instance to the human body, and it does so because of 
the body’s manifestation of moral virtues like benevolence and courage. But there 
are indications in Buddhist texts too of this virtue-centric view. In the verses cited 
earlier about the nun, SubhƗ, it is implied that it is appropriate to call her ‘beautiful 
by reason of dhamma’ because of the ways her holiness is manifested in her per-
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sonal cleanliness and the calm and grace of her comportment. Relevant, too, are the 
many testimonies to the Buddha’s physical beauty. Some of these, especially the 
more florid ones in The Buddhacarita, concentrate on his sexual attractiveness to 
women who are ‘overpowered by passion’ in his presence. But even in this work, the 
point is sometimes that the Buddha is found to be physically beautiful – even or 
especially by people ‘with pure minds’ – because of the ‘gentle disposition’ and 
other virtues that his ‘fine countenance’ and posture manifest (AĞvaghoৢa 1894, 
III.2, IV.3). And according to canonical texts, among ‘the thirty-two marks’ of the 
Great Man, nearly all of which make for a ‘manly’ physical beauty, are included – 
alongside having ‘the torso of a lion’ and ‘straight limbs’ – aspects of the Buddha’s 
comportment, such as effortless grace of movement, cleanliness, and calm that are 
expressions of his virtue (ÑƗ৆amoli and Bodhi 1995, 89f).
It is not only in the Pali and Sanskrit literature that there is evidence of a virtue- 
centric understanding of bodily beauty. In East Asian Buddhist writings, too, there 
are similar indications. Here, for example, is a modern author’s summary of the 
concept of yǌgen as developed by the medieval Japanese architect of Nǀ drama, 
Zeami Motokiyo, a Zen Buddhist. This quality of mystery that the drama seeks to 
evoke is one of beauty, yet this is a ‘beauty not merely of appearance, but of the 
spirit’. Indeed, it is this ‘inner beauty’ of yǌgen that Zeami emphasizes. It is made 
clear, however, that this inner quality possesses beauty precisely because of the way 
it ‘manifest[s] itself outwards’, in the beautiful gestures, glances and poise of the 
actors (Ueda 1995, 182).
That there is no warrant for referring to inner beauty – for speaking of the virtu-
ous mind or character as beautiful – unless this beauty is expressed in and through 
the body is, then, a claim that is at least suggested in various Buddhist writings. But 
does beautiful bodily expression provide a sufficient warrant for speaking of inner 
beauty? There is, it seems to me, something missing from what has so far been said. 
There is, at any rate, a further dimension of the expression of ‘inner reality’ that has 
not yet been exposed. It is the purpose of the next section to repair this omission.
 ‘Attracting the Heart’
For a person’s character or ‘inner reality’ to qualify as beautiful, it must, I want to 
say, be ‘magnetic’. It must, to borrow the title of a book about Sri Lankan Buddhism 
that I discuss below, ‘attract the heart’. It matters little, for my purposes, whether 
this magnetism or attraction is thought of as a further condition of inner beauty, in 
addition to bodily expression, or as an aspect of this expression that deserves to be 
made salient in an account of inner beauty. Either way, it is going to be in and 
through the body that a person exercises magnetism and attracts hearts.
That beauty must be magnetic and attractive, through exerting an energy or radi-
ance that draws people to it, is an idea to be found in Plato, Plotinus and later Neo- 
Platonist Christian thinkers such as the Pseudo-Dionysius. Indeed, it is this 
magnetism, such thinkers maintained, that distinguishes the beautiful from the 
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good. There is an elegant modern statement of the idea by Michael McGhee in his 
discussion of ‘the beautiful soul’. ‘Certain states of a person’, he writes, ‘can be 
considered “beautiful”’, and this is because the person who exemplifies such beauty 
‘embodies or mediates a certain concentration of energy’. This energy sustains ‘a 
certain demeanour and perspective’, and through this ‘radiates and attracts’. It is an 
energy, McGhee continues, that is aptly described as an ‘object’ or ‘form of eros’ 
(McGhee 2000, 183).
This seems right. For a person to count as beautiful, it is not enough that his or 
her virtue shows up in some way – in, let’s say, donations that they make to chari-
ties, or in morally uplifting books that they write. It must show up in an aesthetically 
charged way – in gestures, say, or demeanour, ‘style’ and presence – that draws 
others, sensitive to the ‘energy’ being radiated, to the person.
Interestingly, McGhee gives the example of a bodhisattva as someone who quali-
fies in this manner to be regarded as a beautiful soul. Many Buddhists would wel-
come the example. It is worth pointing out before continuing that when McGhee 
and I talk of ‘the beautiful soul’, we do not intend to refer to an immaterial entity 
distinct from the body or to a ‘substance’ underlying a person’s changing mental 
states. We do not, that is, have in mind anything that is rejected in Buddhist texts 
that deny the existence of the soul, any more than we do when speaking of ‘soul 
music’. The phrase ‘the beautiful soul’ has become part of Western philosophical 
discourse, and is a convenient one – when stripped of metaphysical implications – 
for speaking of the beauty of a person’s mind, character and life. Buddhists, as I 
said, should welcome the example of the bodhisattva as someone with a beautiful 
soul. For, just as there was recognition that inner beauty must be bodily expressed, 
so there is an acknowledgement in some Buddhist texts that inner beauty must 
attract.
Consider once more the texts that attest to the Buddha’s personal beauty. Gotama, 
according to the Buddhacarita, was ‘radiant in his beauty’, and seeing him there 
‘stand[ing] in his beauty’, men and women are drawn to ‘devote’ themselves and 
‘offer reverence’ to him (AĞvaghoৢa 1894, III.23-4). Or consider the sequence of 
verses in the Dhammapada in which the search for perfection is compared to a per-
son’s – or a bee’s – search for a beautifully scented flower. The words and actions of 
someone, in order to be beautiful, must exude a ‘perfume’ that attracts others. ‘The 
perfume of virtue’, one verse tells us, ‘gives joy to the soul’, as does ‘the light of 
wisdom’ emitted by a truly enlightened follower of the dhamma (Mascaró 1973, 
vv.44–59). Inner beauty exerts the same magnetism on the searcher for perfection as 
a flower’s scent does on the bee.
The theme of beauty’s magnetism is a persistent one. In the thirteenth century, 
the Japanese Zen master, Dǀgen, observed that the body of a true follower of 
Buddhism ‘feels at ease’, and its ‘actions take on grace’, so that this person’s 
‘appearance attracts others’ (Dǀgen 1971, 45–6). Here, incidentally, Dǀgen is 
almost certainly recalling not only Buddhist discussions, but a Daoist and Confucian 
tradition in which the de (‘virtue’) of ‘the consummate person’ or sage is conceived 
of in terms of charisma, of an inner goodness that is also a power to influence and 
attract others.
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Beauty’s magnetism is attested to by contemporary Buddhists, too. In his book, 
Attracting the Heart, Jeffrey Samuels examines ‘the aesthetics of the emotions’ in 
present-day Sri Lankan religious life. His research provides a rich source of Buddhist 
testimonies, mainly from monks and novices, to the magnetic power of moral 
beauty. His interlocutors speak, for example, of how they try to ‘go beautifully in 
order to attract the people’s hearts’ – through their dignified gait, say, or clean- 
shaven cleanliness. A monk must be ‘beautiful to the eye’ – or to the ear, when 
reciting verses – in order make people ‘feel longing’ for the holy life (Samuels 
2010, xxiv, 78–9). As Samuels points out, his research confirms the value of Michael 
Carrithers’ thesis of an ‘aesthetic standard’ that informs Buddhist practice and 
invests it with ‘a quality of bodily movement … posture … speech and action’ 
(Carrithers 1990, 158). Indeed, it seems to confirm that the purpose of some of the 
Patimokkha rules in the Vinaya Piٓaka is, as Samuels puts it, to ‘transform a monk 
into an aesthetically pleasing object’ (Samuels 2010, 72).
This and preceding sections of the chapter have attempted to justify the notion of 
inner beauty – a beauty of the person or character – that several authors attribute to 
Buddhist thinking. I have tried, too, to show that such a justification is at least inti-
mated in Buddhist texts and testimony. What I have argued, and what is intimated in 
these texts, is that virtue, in order to constitute beauty of character, must be beauti-
fully expressed in and through the body, in a way moreover that exerts magnetism 
or attraction.
Attention turned to inner beauty in the wake of my downbeat assessment of 
Buddhism’s concern with the worldly beauty of things. This is not to say, however, 
that there can be no such concern, and in the final section of the chapter I explore 
the possibility that a distinctively Buddhist understanding of beauty in art may be 
inspired by the Buddhist understanding of inner beauty. Earlier, I questioned 
Batchelor’s assertion that awakened experience is ‘an experience of beauty’, but 
maybe he is right to suggest, immediately afterwards, that through the awareness 
sought by Buddhists ‘our appreciation of the arts is also enriched’ (Batchelor 1998, 
105). If this right, however, it will only be because the beauty appreciated in art is 
intimately related to the inner beauty that I have been discussing.
 Body, Art and Beauty
Let me first, however, set aside an account of the Buddhist notion of beauty in art 
with which my own might be confused. For some Buddhists, the most un-Buddhist 
feature of our ordinary discourse of beauty is its discrimination, on the basis of 
subjective experience, between beautiful and non-beautiful things. ‘The “beauty” 
that simply stands opposed to ugliness is not true beauty … [but] a dualistic idea’, 
wrote the Japanese Buddhist theorist of art and craft, Yanagi Sǀetsu. True beauty, he 
continues, is a state of mind, of ‘freedom from impediment’ and ‘preoccupation’. 
And for someone who achieves this state of mind, ‘everything is beautiful’, includ-
ing all works of art (Yanagi 1989, 130, 138).
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These remarks try, in their way, to relate beauty in the world to an inner, ‘true’ 
beauty of mind, but unsuccessfully. The fact that Yanagi himself constantly makes 
the very distinctions between beautiful and vulgar – or graceful and garish – art- 
works that he enjoins us to rise above is not a fatal objection, but it does indicate a 
serious problem. Whether or not an intelligible concept of beauty, according to 
which everything is beautiful, can be developed, it is clear that this would not be our 
ordinary, central concept of beauty. But it is precisely this that people surely have in 
mind when they ask if there is a distinctive Buddhist understanding of beauty in the 
world and in art. To be told that, on the Buddhist understanding of ‘true beauty’, all 
art is beautiful is, in effect, to be told that Buddhism has nothing to contribute to the 
aesthetics of beauty in art.
The challenge is to work outwards towards a notion of beauty in the world and in 
art – one that is compatible with ‘discrimination’ between the beautiful and the non- 
beautiful – from the notion of inner beauty that I articulated earlier. The first step in 
this procedure is a very short one. We have already encountered, in effect, a clear- 
cut, indeed paradigmatic, case of worldly beauty – in the gesture, demeanour, com-
portment or whatever that gives beautiful expression to virtue of character, and 
thereby justifies reference to inner beauty. The body and its actions are in and of the 
world, their beauty is, in this sense at least, worldly beauty.
Crucially, we have also encountered a case where beauty of bodily expression is 
at the same time a case of beauty in art. Towards the end of the section ‘Expression 
and virtue’, I noted Zeami’s view that a certain kind of inner beauty ‘manifests itself 
outwards’ in the gestures, glances and poise of a man. But this man is an actor in a 
Nǀ drama, whose beautiful bodily expression therefore belongs to an art form. More 
generally, in an appropriate context bodily movements and activity may constitute 
artistic performance – a dance, say, or a mime. In such contexts, there is no diffi-
culty in seeing that art inherits, via the bodily activity that constitutes it, the inner 
beauty that it expresses.
This point may be extended to some other arts and practices, including many of 
those that, in East Asia, are called ‘ways’ (Japanese do, as in judo). Not all of these – 
swordsmanship, for example, or calligraphy (shodo), or the way of tea (chado) – 
figure on the standard Western lists of ‘The Arts’, and certainly not of ‘The Fine 
Arts’. But in Asia a distinction between arts and crafts, and between these and vari-
ous other do, is not a marked one. Indeed, it is regarded as an artificial and poten-
tially misleading dualism. (One reason for this is mentioned below.)
Arts or ‘ways’ like archery, the tea ceremony and gardening differ from dance 
and mime, typically, in having a practical purpose, such as hitting a target, making 
tea or creating a garden. That is one reason why, again typically, these arts require 
the use of ‘instruments’ – a sword, a tea whisk, a hoe – as well as bodily movement. 
But it is not unnatural to regard these instruments as extensions of the body, as hon-
orary parts of the body, so to speak. For in none of these practices is the instrument 
a mere tool, to be used in a way dictated solely by a goal. These instruments are to 
be used with respect and, like one’s hands, with expression. The Zen gardener or tea 
master is not just clearing away weeds or brewing up a nice cup of tea. He is engaged 
in a practice that bodies forth the virtues, including compassion and humility, mind-
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fulness and friendship. In effect, he is concerned to practice an art or follow a way 
in a beautiful style. Like Zeami’s actor or a dancer in a Buddhist temple, the  gardener 
and tea master – through their own and their extended, ‘honorary’ body – seek for 
beautiful physical expression of an inner beauty.
Some readers, at this stage, will reasonably ask how the idea of outer beauty as 
an expression of the inner applies to works of art, and not simply to artistic bodily 
practices. Two points, however, should immediately be made that reduce the urgency 
of this request. The first is that in many of the Buddhist inspired arts or ways, the 
sharp distinction familiar in Western discourse between practice and product, 
between artistry and art-work, is rejected. It may be an exaggeration to say that, for 
Zen gardeners, ‘caring for the garden is not a chore, but the very point of having a 
garden in the first place’ (Keane 1996, 128). But it not only conveys that gardening 
is not a mere means to an end – the garden itself – but that, as a place that depends 
on a gardener’s continuing care, the garden is not a finished product distinct from 
the practice of making and maintaining it. To focus, therefore, on the beauty of a 
practice is not, in the case of many ‘ways’, to ignore the beauty of something – the 
‘work’ – that is separable from the practice.
Second, even when a distinction is made between a bodily action and its artistic 
product, many Buddhist artists would refuse to accept that aesthetic attention should 
exclusively, or even primarily, be devoted to the latter. It is easy enough, of course, 
to distinguish a calligrapher’s action in drawing with a brush and ink from the char-
acters – there before our eyes on a piece of paper – that are the result of this action. 
But when it is said of the twentieth-century Buddhist priest and calligrapher, Kobara 
Sensei, that he and his art ‘had become one’ (Davey 2007, loc 219), the point is to 
emphasize that the products of the man’s art are not to be appreciated in isolation 
from admiration for the man himself, for the virtues, like kindness, that enable his 
works to look the way they do.
Kobara’s virtue – his inner beauty – enables his works to look as they do in and 
through the bodily movements, the physical style, that at once express it and create 
the characters on the paper. This is an example of the general way in which, for 
Buddhists, art-works inherit the inner beauty of the people who make them. By giv-
ing a sense of the beautiful bodily engagement through which they came into exis-
tence, the works themselves body forth the inner beauty of the virtues. Interestingly 
in twentieth-century Western art criticism, there also developed an appreciation of 
works as expressive of the bodily activity responsible for them. A significant aspect, 
for example, of people’s enjoyment of works by Van Gogh, Rodin and Pollock is the 
palpable sense these works provide of a strength and energy that went into their 
making. The difference between this episode in Western art appreciation and the 
more abiding Asian tradition I have been discussing is the concern in the latter for 
the moral beauty that is expressed in an artist’s bodily practice.
By extending to art the idea of the body as being beautiful in and through its 
‘magnetic’ expression of inner beauty, it is possible, then, to endorse Stephen 
Batchelor’s remark that Buddhism is not just ‘inner experiences. It is known through 
buildings, gardens, sculptures, paintings, calligraphy, poetry and craftwork’ and 
‘present in’ the marks and gestures of ‘artists and artisans’ (Batchelor 2011, 151).
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Still, some people will wonder, aren’t there beautiful works of art that do not give 
any sense of the bodily activity – or of the person – responsible for their production? 
Aren’t there, that is, beautiful works that are silent about their provenance and are 
not, therefore, expressions of inner beauty? Possibly there are, but these will not be 
works that Buddhism encourages us to experience and enjoy. At the very least, they 
are works that – rather like the women, mentioned earlier, who possess ‘the sign of 
the beautiful’ – must be approached with circumspection, for they invite attachment 
and craving. They would be works, in one Buddhist author’s words, whose ‘aes-
thetic value lies only in our own conditioned appreciation’, so that we have no 
consistent ‘yardstick by which to measure [their] beauty’ (Story 1985, 403). It may 
be, therefore, that there are modes of beauty to which some people attest but that 
cannot be accepted as authentic ones by Buddhists. This will only sound like a criti-
cism of Buddhism to those persuaded by a recent popular tendency to present 
Buddhism as an entirely genial spiritual dispensation that smilingly welcomes 
almost the whole range of people’s tastes and enjoyments.
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